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ABSTRACT: Our search model combines two search methods, the public employment 
service (PES) and random search. The separation rate is endogenous, the job matching 
process consists of three stages. In the first and the second respectively the short-term 
(STU) and the long-term unemployed (LTU) randomly search for a vacancy. In the last 
stage the PES matches registered jobseekers with registered vacancies. The LTU cause 
training costs and, during the training period, have a lower marginal product than the STU. 
The effects of the hiring subsidy and of profiling techniques to increase the effectiveness of 
the PES depend on the target group. For target groups, who have relatively low private 
search costs in comparison with their productivity, not only the hiring subsidy but also the 
job placement activities of the PES are counterproductive and reduce overall employment. 
 
 
KEY-WORDS:  Matching model, hiring subsidy, endogenous separation rate,    
  active labour market policy, PES, search market 
 
JEL-CODE: J41, J63, J64, J68 
 
a  Institute for Employment Research and University Erlangen Nuernberg, Regensburger Straße 104, 90478 Nuernberg, 
Germany, Elke.Jahn@iab.de. 
b  University of Applied Sciences, Nuernberg, Hastverstr. 31, 90408 Nuernberg, Germany,  
Thomas.Wagner@fh-nuernberg.de.   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Millard/Mortensen (1997), Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 2001) and Pissarides (2000, ch. 9) 
are search models which analyse the effects of active labour market policies (ALMP) on equi-
librium unemployment. In these models, the labour market is characterised by a matching 
technology which represents the two-sided search process with its frictions – due to imperfect 
information, mobility costs and heterogeneities. Each new match of a job seeker with a va-
cancy is entitled to a hiring subsidy. The hiring subsidy increases both the number of newly 
created jobs and the amount of job destruction. Therefore, its overall effect on equilibrium 
unemployment is ambiguous. Millard/Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 
2001) thus estimate the net effects of the subsidy with the help of numerical simulations.  
Our model differs from the above-mentioned in the following respects. First, two search 
methods are available, the public employment service (PES) and random search (Pissarides 
1979). Second, ALMP is available only for the long-term unemployed (LTU). A hiring subsi-
dy is paid to firms which register their vacancy and fill it with a LTU worker placed by the 
PES. The PES also has the option to subsidise matches established through random search. 
Third, the model’s matching process consists of three subsequent stages. In the first and sec-
ond stage respectively the short-term unemployed (STU) and the active job seekers among the 
LTU randomly search for a vacancy, in the third stage the PES matches registered vacancies 
with the registered unemployed. Fourth, the unemployed choose between a passive and an 
active search strategy. The active LTU combine both methods of search. The passive unem-
ployed wait for a placement by the PES.  
The model generates the following results. (1) Equilibrium unemployment depends negati-
vely on both unemployment incidence and duration, and on the fraction of passive job see-
kers. (2) Moreover, the hiring subsidy increases job destruction and unemployment duration 
of passive job seekers, and reduces the proportion of active job seekers among the STU and 
LTU as well as the job-to-job transitions. As a consequence, it decreases overall employment. 
(3) It increases the fraction of the LTU, their average outside wage, and the expenses of the 
PES for passive and active measures. (4) Furthermore, the LTU must accept a wage penalty. 
(5) Intuition - embodied for example in the German “Job-Aqtiv-law” – recommends increa-
sing the effectiveness of the public placement service in order to reduce equilibrium u-
nemployment. This intuition is not confirmed by our model. (6) Strengthening the job seekers' 
bargaining power decreases equilibrium unemployment. 
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is 
derived. Section 3 introduces the asset equations of filled jobs and employed workers. Section 
4 deals with job creation. Section 5 covers the asset equations of the unemployed and wage 
negotiations. In Section 6, the equilibrium values of the filled jobs, the dispersions of the out-
side wages of the LTU and the job destruction condition are derived. Section 7 presents a nu-  2 
merical simulation and section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs and a graphical 
presentation of the simulation results. 
2. STEADY STATE AND HIRING SUBSIDY 
The time of the model is discrete. Job creation takes place at the beginning, job destruction 
at the end of a period, s. Fig. 1. The search process is two-sided. A continuum of vacancies 
searches for applicants, who can be of two different types: The first type are the short-term 
unemployed (STU) who have lost their job only at the end of the previous period. The second 
type has been without a job for one period or more and is either threatened by long-term un-
employment or already belongs to the long-term unemployed (LTU).
1 
Methods and strategies of search. The model analyses the interactions of two search meth-
ods, the PES and random search, and two strategies of search, active search on the private 
search market and passive search through the job placement service of the PES. The search 
strategy of the vacancies is not specialised. Vacancies are simultaneously posted on the pri-
vate search market where they randomly search for a worker and are registered with the PES. 
Unemployed workers choose between the active and the passive search strategy and the com-
binations of both strategies. 
Workers who lose their job register with the PES to claim unemployment benefit and to 
avail of the job placement service. But registration often takes place only after days or weeks 
have passed since the beginning of the unemployment spell. Once the worker has notified the 
PES it reviews the right to the claim, registers and advises the unemployed worker and refers 
him to the placement service. The placement agency then looks for available jobs and either 
makes a job offer or not, depending on the number of registered vacancies and registered un-
employed waiting for a placement. When the first offer arrives at the end of the reaction time 
the worker has often already found a job. How much time passes between the first day of an 
unemployment spell und the first job offer of the PES? Despite extensive research we have 
not found data on the distribution of the reaction time and have thus introduced the following 
assumption. 
We assume that the reaction time lasts at least one period. Hence, the STU workers who 
decide on the active search strategy are certainly dependent on their own search efforts alone. 
Moreover, STU workers opting for the passive strategy and leaving all search activities up to 
the PES can expect a job offer in the second period of the unemployment spell at the earliest. 
                                                 
1  With respect to the differentiation between the STU and the LTU a model in discrete time is to be preferred 
to a model in continuous time. It is also easier to solve. However the assumption of a discrete time structure 
produces the following trade-off: On the one hand the reference period should not be too short so as not to 
vary too much from the usual time limitations between the STU and the LTU (North America: 6 months and 
over, Europe: 12 months and over). On the other hand the reference period should not be too long because, as 
we will assume, at least one model period elapses before an unemployed worker receives the first job offer 
from the PES.   3 
Given the reaction time the PES can place only LTU workers – workers who are either threat-
ened with long-term unemployment or who are already long-term unemployed. 
Passive LTU workers leave the job search up to the PES. Active jobseekers among the LTU 
use both search methods simultaneously the PES and the private search market. Hence, in 
equilibrium their transition probability is higher than that of the LTU who have chosen to wait 
for a placement by the PES. But using the search market generates search costs so that, in 
equilibrium, only a part of the unemployed decide on the active search strategy. 
Search process. The search process consists of three stages, s. Fig. 1. In the first, only the 
I S  active job seekers among the STU are searching. They possess the best information about 
current labour market conditions and, therefore, their applications are more targeted and ar-
rive earlier than the placements of the PES or the applications of the active job seekers among 
the LTU. 
In the second stage, advertised vacancies meet the S active job seekers among the LTU. In 
the last stage of the matching process the PES arranges matches between registered vacancies 
and the registered unemployed. 
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Fig. 1: The search process  
Transition probabilities. The labour force is normalised to unity. Of the  u − 1  employed, 
() ( ) u R G I − = 1 λ  lose their job at the end of a period, s. Fig. 1.  ) (R G λ  is the unemployment 
incidence where λ  is the probability of an idiosyncratic productivity shock,  () x G  with support 
1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α  is the c.d.f. of the multiplicative shock x and R is the endogenous reservation 
productivity.  yx , with  0 > y , is the flow output of a job. If a match draws productivity x with 
1 ≤ ≤ x R , worker and firm decide to continue the job. If  R x < , the match terminates, the job 
becomes vacant, and the worker unemployed. 
Of the I workers who lose their job,  I S  decide in favour of the active search strategy and 
immediately at the beginning of the next period start to search randomly for an unfilled va-
cancy, s. Fig. 1. The other  0 ≥ − I S I  workers prefer the passive strategy, and, with the be-
ginning of the subsequent period, they are threatened with long-term unemployment and be-
long to the group of LTU. The matching technology of the search market, which is specified 
below, generates the transition probability  I p  that a given job seeker among the STU will 
find a vacancy. As the STU have a marginal product which is at least as high as that of the   4 
LTU and do not cause training costs, each match of a STU worker with an advertised vacancy 
results in an employment contract. Therefore the measure of the STU,  S u , is given by 
S I I u S p I = − .        (1) 
Of the pool u of LTU,  0 ≥ − S u  workers choose the passive search strategy and wait for a 
placement via the PES. Their unemployment duration hazard i.e. their transition probability 
into employment is  () () ( ) P S I T F q q P − − 1 1 , where P denotes the probability of a contact with 
a vacancy found by the PES,  I q  and  S q  are the probabilities that the vacancy is already filled 
either by one of the  I S  job seekers among the STU or by one of the S job seekers among the 
LTU. 
Each match with a LTU worker generates match specific training costs  0 ≥ t , of which ex 
ante only the c.d.f.  ) (t F  with support  ∞ < ≤ t 0  and the endogenous reservation costs  P T  are 
known. The reservation costs  P T  are the training costs up to which firms and the LTU are 
interested in signing a job contract. A match with a LTU worker with training costs  P T t >  is 
immediately broken up again; the job remains vacant and the job seeker unemployed. Then, 
() P T F  denotes the probability that the match partners face training costs  P T t ≤ . 
The transition probability for the S active job seekers among the LTU is 
()( ) ( ) () ( ) [] P S S S S I T F q P p T F p q − − + − 1 1 1 . First, the located vacancy must still be free. The 
probability to locate an unfilled vacancy through random search is  () I S q p − 1 . Even if ran-
dom search is not successful, the active job seekers among the LTU still have the chance to be 
placed by the PES. The probability to be placed by the PES after random search has failed is 
() () S I q q P − − 1 1 . Second, the job seeker must draw training costs that are below the reserva-
tion costs of the respective search method. If active labour market policy discriminates be-
tween the two methods of search and subsidizes for example only placements by the PES then 
reservation costs depend on the search method.  S T  is the reservation cost of the search market 
and  P T  the reservation cost of the matching process organised by the PES. 
Summarising the flows into employment which result from the above transition probabili-
ties and taking into account that  S u  denotes the inflow into the pool of long-term unemployed 
u yields the steady state condition: 
() () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) [] S T F q P T F q p u T F q q P u P S S I S P S I S − − − + − − = 1 1 1 1 .   (2) 
The LTU prefer the active search strategy only if the transition probability from combining 
the two methods of search is higher than that of the passive search strategy alone. Given the 
above transition probabilities this necessary condition for active job search is fulfilled iff 
() ( ) () P S S T F q P T F − > 1 . 
Matching function. The function  () v x m ,  represents the matching technology of the search 
market, where m is the number of contacts per period for a given measure of job seekers x and 
advertised vacancies v. The matching function has constant returns to scale, is strictly concave 
and monotone in both arguments. Immediately at the beginning of a period,  () v S m I ,  of the v   5 
advertised vacancies are filled by the STU who are actively searching. For a given vacancy 
posted at the beginning of a period, the probability of a match with a STU worker is 
() () ( ) v v S m m q I I I , 1 , 1 = ≡ θ θ , with  I I S v = θ  denoting the tightness of the labour market 
in the first stage of the matching process. The transition probability of a given active job 
seeker among the STU is  () () I I I q p θ θ θ = . For convenience we write  () I I q q θ =  and 
() I I p p θ = . 
The S active job seekers among the LTU workers face the same v advertised vacancies. 
) , ( v S m represents the measure of contacts, and  () ( ) ( ) v v S m m q S S , 1 , / 1 = ≡ θ θ  is the contact 
probability of a given vacancy with one of the active job seekers among the LTU – with 
S v S = θ  denoting the tightness of the labour market in the second stage of the matching 
process. The contact probability of a given job seeker is  () () S S S q p θ θ θ = , and we write 
() S S q q θ =  and  () S S p p θ = . 
As all vacancies are advertised as well as registered, v is also an argument in the matching 
function  () v u M ,  of the PES, which has the same properties as  () v x m , . M is the measure of 
contacts per period which the PES brings about with v registered vacancies and a stock of u 
registered long-term unemployed. For a given vacancy, therefore, 
() ( ) ( ) v v u M M Q , 1 , / 1 = ≡ Θ Θ  is the contact probability with a registered LTU worker via the 
PES – with  u v = Θ  denoting the tightness between both registers of the PES. Thus, for the 
registered unemployed, the probability of a contact with a registered vacancy is 
() ) (Θ Θ Θ Q P = . 
Unemployment duration. The duration of an unemployment spell depends on the search 
strategy chosen by an unemployed. If the unemployed leaves the job search up to the PES, 
then he will be out of work for at least one period and taking into account the above transition 
probabilities the average length of time required for a job search will be  P P d D + =1 , where 
() () ( ) P S I P T F q q P d − − = 1 1 1 .  P d  is the duration of job search of a long-term unemployed 
who prefers the passive search strategy. The duration of unemployment of an actively search-
ing LTU worker is  ()( ) ( ) () ( ) [] P S S S S I S T F q P p T F p q d − − + − = 1 1 1 1 . An unemployed who 
combines the passive search strategy in the first period of his unemployment spell with the 
active search strategy in all subsequent periods faces a duration of unemployment equal to 
S S d D + =1 . While an unemployed worker who opts for the active search strategy from the 
beginning on faces an expected duration of job search of () S I D p − 1  periods. 
Inserting equation (1) into equation (2), using  () ( ) u R G I − = 1 λ  and taking into account the 
above definitions of the tightness in the three labour market segments, we obtain the follow-
ing equation for equilibrium unemployment in the steady state 
()
() ( ) P S S S I I d d p R G
R G
u
/ 1 / σ σ σ λ
λ
− + + +
= ,     (3) 
where  1 ≤ = u S S σ  is the share of active LTU job seekers among the unemployed and 
u SI I = σ  is the ratio of active job seekers among the STU to the pool of unemployed u.   6 
Contrary to the share  S σ  the ratio  I σ  is not bounded from above. The unemployment rate (3) 
cet. par. increases if the job destruction rate  G λ  increases, the durations of job search of the 
active or the passive search strategy increase, the ratio of job-to-job transitions to the number 
of unemployed,  I I p σ , or the share of active job seekers among the LTU worker decrease. 
The impact of  S σ  on u is due to the fact that  P S d d <  is a necessary condition for the deci-
sion of the LTU workers to search actively for a job. But if  P S d d < , then u increases with a 
decreasing share  S σ  of active job seekers among the LTU workers. 
Hiring subsidy. The PES is fully integrated (OECD 1996) and provides the following ser-
vices. First, it pays unemployment benefits. Second, it matches registered vacancies with reg-
istered job seekers, and third it pursues active labour market policies (ALMP). In this last 
function, the PES pays a hiring subsidy to firms that enter into an employment contract with a 
LTU worker. The hiring subsidy is paid when the match partners sign the contract and incur 
the training costs  0 ≥ t . The subsidy therefore compensates for the training costs. Training 
expenditures can be monitored by the PES without costs. Since the support of the distribution 
of training costs is not bounded from above, the PES establishes an upper bound H on the hir-
ing subsidy so that the training costs of all matches with  H t ≤  are fully subsidized, whereas 
matches with  0 > − H t  have to finance the balance out of the match rent. 
3. FILLED JOBS 
Each match combines a vacant job with a job seeker. The partners of a new contact first de-
termine the match specific training costs t. If t exceeds the reservation costs, the agents sepa-
rate immediately. Otherwise, they negotiate the conditions of the employment contract and 
start production thereafter.  
An employment contract  () [] R x w wi , ,  has three components. The first is the outside wage 
i w  which is paid to the worker throughout the initial period, the training period. It depends on 
his status i as a job seeker - on whether he is a STU worker with  I i =  or a LTU worker who 
has opted either for the passive,  P i = , or the active search strategy (which combines the two 
methods of search),  S i = . The second component of the contract is the match specific inside 
wage represented by the wage function  []ℜ → 1 , : R w . At the end of a period the productivity 
x, which is valid during the subsequent period, is revealed to the match. If  [] 1 , R x∈ , the match 
continues and the worker earns the bargained inside-wage  () x w . Therefore, after each shock 
to the match specific productivity, worker and firm renegotiate the conditions of the employ-
ment contract, especially the wage
2. The third component defines the reservation threshold R 
at which the job will be destroyed.  
Continuation periods. After the training period all jobs have the same productivity y. 
Shocks hit a match with probability  0 ≥ λ , are match specific, and manifest in the multiplica-
                                                 
2   Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) present a discussion of objections against the plausibility 
of this assumption and the two-tier wage structure which results from the possibility of renegotiation.   7 
tive productivity component x, which is a random variable with c.d.f.  () x G  defined on 
[] 1 , α ∈ x . Within each period only one shock can occur. Furthermore, shocks are iid. 
Let  () x Π  be the present value of a filled job after the manifestation of a shock  [] 1 , α ∈ x . 
Worker and firm, considering their reservation utility, are both interested in continuing the 
match as long as  () 0 ≥ x Π  and agree on job destruction as soon as  () 0 < x Π . Since  () x Π  is 
a continuously monotonically increasing function of x, as will be shown below, a reservation 
threshold R exists, for which 
() 0 = R Π .       (4) 
Only jobs with  R x ≥  will be continued. We assume that the firm markets the output yx at 
the end of the period at the same time as it pays the bargained wage  () x w . Then the steady 
state equation for the present value  () x Π  of a filled job is 
() () () () ( ) () { } ∫ − + + − =
1
1
R x h dG h x w yx x Π λ Π λ ρ Π .     (5) 
Flow and stock variables are discounted at the rate ρ , where  1 1 1 0 < + = < r ρ  with the 
interest rate  0 > r . With probability λ  the job is hit by a shock and changes into a state h. If 
1 ≤ ≤ h R  the match is continued and the continuation asset value becomes  () h Π . With prob-
ability  λ − 1  the match specific productivity does not change. 
A worker who is employed at the match specific productivity yx gets the wage  () x w , and 
his human capital has the present value  () x W . The asset pricing equation for  () x W  is  






 − +  

 
 + + = ∫ x W U R G h dG h W x w x W
R I λ λ ρ 1
1
.   (6) 
With probability λ  a shock occurs and the match draws the productivity h. If  R h ≥ , the 
value of the worker is  () h W  and the match continues. If, on the other hand,  R h < , which oc-
curs with probability  () R G , the job is destroyed, the worker becomes a short-term unem-
ployed and the value of his human capital is  I U . 
Training period. Firms choose the initial productivity when they set up the match and nego-
tiate the outside wage. If the job seeker is a STU worker, the initial productivity is set at 
1 = x . Moreover, the STU do not generate training costs and therefore the initial value  I Π  of 
a job filled by a STU worker is 
() () ( ) ( ) { } ∫ − + + − =
1
1 1
R I I h dG h w y Π λ Π λ ρ Π ,     (7) 
with  I w  denoting the negotiated outside wage. If the match is not hit by a shock, the 
worker’s productivity remains at  1 = x  in the continuation period as well, and the filled job 
has the value  () 1 Π . The human capital of a worker who starts production as a STU worker is   8 






 − +  

 
 + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W w W
R I I I λ λ ρ ,   (8) 
where  () 1 W  denotes the value of the worker in the continuation period if no shock occurs. 
The LTU find a vacancy either through random search or via the PES. When wage negotia-
tions between a vacancy and a LTU worker start, jobs filled by the STU are already produc-
tive. Moreover, the LTU need a training period and, therefore, we assume that their initial 
productivity yz, with  1 ≤ z , is lower than the initial productivity of a STU worker. The alloca-
tion of the training costs and the hiring subsidy is subject to negotiation, but the outside wage 
() t wi  and the initial value of the job  () t i Π  depend only on t if t exceeds the subsidy bound 
H, where  P i =  if the LTU worker has opted for the passive and  S i =  if he has chosen the 
active search strategy. 
For the sake of brevity, we present the asset equations only for the case where the training 
costs exceed the subsidy H. The indicator variable  {} 1 , 0 ∈ τ  takes on the value of one if the 
PES also subsidises the matches formed by random search, while  0 = τ  if H is paid only to 
matches arranged by the PES. Considering the status of the job seeker  S P i , = , the present 
value of a job filled with a LTU worker is given by 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) () {} ∫ − + + − =
1
1 1
R i i h dG h t w yz t Π λ Π λ ρ Π ,     (9) 
where in (9) and also in (10)  P T t H ≤ ≤  for  P i =  and  S T t H ≤ ≤ τ  for  S i = . 
Taking into account the negotiated outside wage  ) (t wi  the present value of the worker's 
human capital during the training period is 






 − +  

 
 + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W t w t W
R I i i λ λ ρ .   (10) 
4. JOB CREATION AND RESERVATION COSTS 
All vacancies are advertised and registered, no vacancy specialises in one of the two search 
methods
3. Entrance into the labour market is free for all vacancies, but open only at the begin-
ning of a period. The flow of vacancies therefore persists until the present value of a vacancy 
is driven to zero,  0 = V . Considering this infinitely elastic supply of vacancies, the job crea-
tion condition is  () I I I I V q q k − + + − = 1 0 Π , where k denotes the flow costs for advertising 
and for registration with the PES. If there is no contact with a STU worker in the first stage of 
                                                 
3   Specialisation may occur due to the heterogeneity of the job seekers or the jobs or because of increasing 
search costs. We assume that the search cost function of a vacancy with respect to the two search methods is 
sub-additive, so that, considering the asset value of a vacancy, it is advantageous for firms to offer vacancies 
through both channels.   9 
the matching process - an event which has the probability  I q − 1  - the vacancy takes on the 
value of its outside option  0 > I V . 
There are three reasons for the existence of an outside option with the value  I V . First, va-
cancies are not specialised. Second, the matching process consists of three stages. A vacancy 
that is not filled during the first has the option to meet a LTU worker who is actively search-
ing for a job or placed by the PES in the second or third stage of the matching process respec-
tively. The value of this option is  I V . Third, the supply of vacancies is perfectly inelastic in 
the last two stages of the matching process.  
The above job creation condition can also be interpreted as follows. Due to search costs, 
each successful match generates a positive rent, which is distributed between worker and firm 
through the wage.  I I V − Π  is the firm’s share of the rent of a match with a STU worker,  I Π  
is the value of the filled job, and  I V  is the value of the outside option of the vacancy. The 
price which the firm pays for participating in the matching process is k, the implicit price for 
the first stage is  I V k − . Thus, the job creation condition states that the flow of vacancies into 
the labour market lasts until the implicit search cost a firm has to incur to take part in the first 








Π .       (11) 
The option value  I V  of a vacancy in the first stage of the matching process, when the 
search costs k are sunk, is 
() [] P S S S S I QV T F q V q V − + = 1 ,        ( 1 2 )  
where  S q  denotes the probability that the vacancy will be filled by a LTU worker who is 
actively seeking.  S V  is the conditional expected value of a job which has contact with such a 
worker. If the vacancy does not meet an active LTU worker or if the training costs of the ap-
plicant exceed  S T  – a composite event with the probability  () S S T F q − 1  – then the vacancy 
still has the third option to meet a LTU worker placed by the PES. The probability of a match 
with a LTU worker placed by the PES is Q, and the conditional option value of the job is  P V
4. 
Reservation costs. The hiring subsidy of the PES compensates for the training costs up to 
the bound H. Matches with the LTU placed by the PES and with training costs t higher than H 
must finance the balance  0 ≥ − H t  out of the match rent. The allocation of the balance is part 
of the contract negotiations, and the value of the filled job,  () t P Π , therefore depends on t. As 
will be shown,  () t P Π  is a monotonically increasing function of t, while the net value of the 
job,  () t H t P − + Π , is a contraction and fulfils the reservation property with respect to t. 
Hence, reservation costs  P T  exist, with 
                                                 
4   Appendix AI contains the asset pricing equations for  S V  and  P V .   10
() H T T P P P + = Π .       (13) 
Match partners whose training costs are lower than  P T  sign an employment contract while 
with  P T t >  they separate immediately. 
A vacancy filled by a LTU worker who is actively searching has the value  () t S Π  if the 
match draws training costs t, with  0 ≥ − H t τ . In view of the third stage of the matching proc-
ess,  P QV  is the value of the outside option of the firm. Therefore, the job will only be filled if 
its net value is at least as high as the value of the option to meet a LTU worker placed by the 
PES,  () P S QV t H t ≥ − +τ Π . Since the net value of the job has the reservation property, res-
ervation costs  S T  also exist for the method of random search 
() P S S S QV H T T − + = τ Π .        (14) 
5. THE VALUE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE NEGOTIATIONS 
A worker who has lost his job must decide between the active and the passive search strat-
egy. Given the exogenous unemployment benefit b and the real return from leisure l the 
worker chooses the strategy which maximises the present-discounted value of his human capi-
tal  I U  
() ( ) () {} U l b p W p c U l b U I I I I I + + − + + − + + = ρ ρ 1 , max ,     (15) 
The choice set of the Bellman equation (15) contains two alternatives. First, if the worker 
prefers the passive strategy, he receives the unemployment benefit b and the imputed income 
from leisure activities l, while his human capital takes on the value U.
5 In the subsequent pe-
riod he has to decide again whether to wait for a placement via the PES or to search and apply 
for a vacancy on the market. In the first case, the value of his human capital is  P U , in the 
second, it is  S U . The worker will opt for the search strategy that maximises the present value 
of his human capital so that 
{} S P U U U , max = .       (16) 
Second, if the STU worker chooses to search randomly, he incurs search costs  0 > I c . 
With probability  I p , he will locate a vacancy, and his value is  I W . With probability  I p − 1  
his search fails, he receives the unemployment benefit b and the real income from leisure l, 
and his human capital takes on the value U.  
The present value of the human capital of a LTU worker who waits for a placement via the 
PES is 
                                                 
5   For simplicity we assume that b is exogenous. The endogenisation of b (Mortensen / Pissarides 2001) lowers 
the incentive to search and thus strengthens the comparative static effects of H, which are shown in Section 
7.   11
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If the worker is matched and if the vacancy for which he applies is not yet filled – the prob-
ability for this composite event is  () () S I q q P − − 1 1  – the value put on the worker by the mar-
ket is  P W  provided that the subsidy compensates fully for the training costs, that is if 
0 ≤ − H t . Otherwise, if the training costs exceed H but are lower than the reservation costs 
P T , the integral in (17) denotes the expected value of the employed worker. If the training 
costs exceed  P T , vacancy and applicant separate, and the present value of the worker is 
() U l b + + ρ  as in the cases where the vacancy is already filled or the LTU is not offered a 
vacancy by the PES. 
If the LTU worker decides on the active search strategy, he will incur search costs  0 > S c . 
Considering the contact probability  S p  generated by the search market, his present-
discounted value is  S U  with 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) []
() P S
P I P S
T
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If the job search fails – either because the LTU worker is confronted with a vacancy already 
filled or because he incurs training costs that exceed  S T  or because he does not find a vacancy 
– his value is equal to the value of the passive strategy  P U  because placement via the PES is 
the final option which concludes the matching process. 
Wage negotiations. Job search takes time and causes search costs. Therefore, each match 
appropriates a monopoly rent which is distributed between the match partners through the 
wage. The distribution rules are obtained according to the generalised Nash solution to a bar-
gaining problem, with  () 1 , 0 ∈ β  denoting the bargaining strength of the job seeker. 
If a STU worker meets a vacancy, the outside wage  I w  for the initial period of the match is 
derived from the sharing rule  






,       (19) 
with  I V  denoting the reservation value of the vacancy, which follows from the firm’s op-
tion to fill the vacant job with a LTU worker. 
If the vacancy meets a LTU worker, the sharing rule depends on the design of the ALMP, 
whether the PES compensates fully for the training costs, or whether the agents have to nego-
tiate the allocation of the balance  0 ≥ − H t . For wage negotiations with a LTU worker who is 

































     (20) 
where  () S S U t W −  is the job seeker’s share of the rent, and  P QV  is the reservation value of 
the vacancy given the third stage of the matching process. 

































    ( 2 1 )  
where  () t H t P − + Π  is the firm’s share of the rent if  P T t H ≤ ≤ . 
Taking into account the idiosyncratic shock  [] 1 , R x∈ , the value of a STU worker,  I U , and 
the fact that in equilibrium the asset price of a vacancy at the initial stage of the search proc-
ess is  0 = V , the sharing rule used for the negotiations with an insider is 






.          ( 2 2 )  
Considering the asset pricing equations (5) – (10) and the sharing rules (19) – (22), we ob-
tain 
 
LEMMA 1 [BARGAINED WAGES]. Given the reservation income  I rU  of a STU worker and 
the asset values  S U  and  P U  of the LTU worker who prefer the active or the passive search 
strategy respectively, the agents negotiate the following inside and outside wages.  
(i)  The bargained inside wage at a match specific productivity  [] 1 , R x∈  is  
() ( ) I I rU yx rU x w − + = β .        (23) 
(ii)  A STU worker who makes a job-to-job transition and produces, in the initial period, 
with productivity  1 = x  receives the outside wage 
() 1 1 − − = ρ β I I V w w ,       (24) 
where  () 1 w  is the inside wage (23) for  1 = x , and  r + = − 1 1 ρ . 
(iii)  If the PES subsidises the training costs, a LTU worker with human capital  P U  placed 
by the PES receives the outside wage  P w  with   13
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 − − − + − − = ρ β β I P P U U y z w w , for  H t ≤ ,     (25) 
where yz, with  1 ≤ z , is the flow output in the training period. 
 
If  P T t H ≤ ≤ , the outside wage  ) (t wP  in the training period is  
() ( ) 1 − − − = ρ β H t w t w P P .        (26) 
(iv)  If  H t τ ≤  a LTU worker with human capital  S U  who finds a job through random 
search receives the outside wage  S w : 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + − − = ρ β ρ β β P I S S QV U U y z w w , for  H t τ ≤ .   (27) 
If the training costs exceed  H τ  the bargained wage is 
() ( ) 1 − − − = ρ τ β H t w t w S S , for  S T t H ≤ ≤ τ .      (28) 
As equation (23) shows, the inside wage equals the reservation income of the worker plus a 
share of the current match rent that depends on his bargaining strength β . As (19) shows, the 
value of the outside option  I V  diminishes the rent of a match with a STU worker, and, as a 
consequence, reduces the share of the current rent (24) a STU worker can appropriate in the 
contract negotiation. The time of the model is discrete. While the reservation value of the va-
cancy refers to the beginning of the period, wages are paid at the end;  I V , therefore, is dis-
counted in (24) to the end of the period. 
The lower the productivity  1 ≤ z  of a LTU worker during the training period, the lower the 
bargained outside wages, as equations (25) and (27) show. Moreover, training costs higher 
than H are partially passed on to the worker, so that the outside wages (26) and (28) respec-
tively fall monotonically with t. 
Finally, the outside wages (25) and (27) depend on the balance of the present values of a 
LTU and a STU worker,  I i U U − ,  S P i , = , and hence on the search strategies the unem-
ployed prefer. To determine the signs and the magnitudes of the rents  I i U U − ,  S P i , = , we 
first have to explain which search strategies the LTU and the STU workers use in equilibrium. 
Choice of the search strategy. If  () U L b UI + + > ρ , then all STU workers immediately 
search for a new job. The number of active job seekers  I S  among the STU rises, the tightness 
I θ  of the search market in the first stage of the matching process diminishes, and the transi-
tion rate  I p  falls. The adjustment comes to an end either because the gains from private job 
search are driven to zero, as  () U L b UI + + = ρ , or because the total inflow searches ran-
domly for a job, so that  I SI = . In the following, we look at the first case and assume that in 
equilibrium the gains from search vanish so that  () U L b UI + + = ρ  and  I SI ≤ .  
The LTU choose the active search strategy if  P S U U > . The number of active job seekers S 
increases, the tightness  S θ  of the labour market in the second stage of the matching process 
decreases, and the contact probability  S p  diminishes until either all workers in the unem-  14
ployment pool u search actively for a job, so that  u S = , or the gains from private job search 
vanish, so that  P S U U =  and  u S ≤ . In the following, we investigate the second case and as-
sume that, in equilibrium,  P S U U =  and  u S ≤ . 
With  P S U U = , the LTU are indifferent to the strategies of search, and from the wage 
equations (25) and (27) it follows for the outside wage of a random searcher among the LTU: 
1 − − = ρ β P P S QV w w , for  H t τ ≤ . Moreover, with  P S U U = , it suffices to determine the sign 
and the magnitude of the rent  I P U U − . If in equilibrium the STU are indifferent to the active 
and the passive search strategy, then the differential rent  I P U U −  can be derived from the 
asset equation (17), the sharing rule (21), and equation (A1) for the option value  P V  of a va-
cancy that, in view of the third stage of the matching process, expects to meet a LTU worker 
placed by the PES (s. App. III):  
() ()
() () ( ) [] P S I
P S I
I P T F q q P










.     (29) 
If the STU are indifferent to both search strategies then the differential rent (29) is strictly 
positive. The reason for this is the reaction time of the PES: the PES is available to the LTU 
whereas it is not to the STU who have just lost their jobs; the STU must wait at least one pe-
riod - after the PES has reviewed their claims, has registered and referred them to the job 
placement service - until the first job offer arrives. During this time, which we assume lasts 
one period or more, the STU have to rely on their own search efforts. 
The differential rent (29) increases together with the probability P for a contact via the PES, 
the reservation costs  P T , the probability () () S I q q − − 1 1  of finding a job that is not yet filled 
by one of the active job seekers, and with the option value  P V . 
6. THE VALUE OF A FILLED JOB, WAGE DISPERSIONS AND JOB DESTRUCTION 
With the wage equations from Lemma 1, the asset equations from section 3, and the condi-
tion of the reservation productivity (4), we can now derive the value of a filled job. 
 
LEMMA 2 [FILLED JOBS]. (i) The continuation value of a filled job producing with the 









β Π 1 .        (30) 
(ii) Taking into account the reservation value  I V , a job filled by a STU worker has the pre-
sent value 
() I I V β Π Π + = 1 ,       (31) 
where  () 1 Π  is the continuation value (30) for the match productivity  1 = x .   15
(iii) A job filled by a LTU worker who is placed and whose training costs are subsidised by 
the PES has the value  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I P P U U y z − − − − − − = β β ρ Π Π 1 1 1 1 , for  H t ≤ .  (32) 
A job filled by a subsidised LTU worker whose training costs exceed H has the present 
value  
() ( ) H t t P P − + = β Π Π , for  P T t H ≤ ≤ .      (33) 
(iv) Since the LTU workers are indifferent between the two search strategies, taking into 
account the reservation value  P QV , a job filled by a worker who is actively searching has the 
asset price 
P P S QV β Π Π + = , for  H t τ ≤ .        (34) 
For training costs t with  S T t H ≤ ≤ τ  we finally obtain 
() ( ) H t t S S τ β Π Π − + = .       (35) 
From the value equations for the filled jobs, we can derive the reservation costs  P T  and  S T . 
 
LEMMA 3 [RESERVATION COSTS]. (i) The reservation costs  P T  which are applied to the 








.       (36) 
From the asset pricing equations (33) - (35) and  () P S S S QV H T T − + = τ Π  we can derive 
the reservation costs for the method of random search 
() P P S QV H T T − − − = τ 1 .       (37) 
(ii) As a consequence of the fact that  () 0 1 > + − = − P S P QV H T T τ , the percentage of LTU 
who cannot be placed via the search market, is always higher than the percentage of LTU 
who cannot be placed via the PES:  () () P S T F T F − > − 1 1 .
6 
 
The dispersions of the outside wages of the LTU during the training period depend on the 
method of search and the distribution of the training costs. 
 
LEMMA 4 [WAGE DISPERSIONS]. (i) The dispersions of the outside wages of the LTU are 
defined on the ranges  () [] P P P w T w ,  and  () [] S S S w T w , , where  () i i T w  is the lowest and  i w  is 
the highest wage of the respective wage dispersion,  S P i , = . From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, 
                                                 
6   With Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 the option values of a vacancy  P V  and  S V  are only functions of the subsidy 
limit H, the reservation costs  P T  and  S T , the tightness Θ , and the design  {} 1 , 0 ∈ τ  of the ALMP (s. App. 
AI).   16
taking into account that in equilibrium  P S U U = , it follows that  () () S S P P T w T w =  and 
0 1 > = − − ρ β P S P QV w w.  
(ii) The average wages of the normalized dispersions are given by 
() ( ) P
T
H P P P T F t dF t w w H F w P ] ) ( ) ( [ ∫ + =  and  () () S
T
H S S S T F t dF t w w H F w S ] ) ( ) ( [ ∫ + = τ τ . If the 
training costs are exponentially distributed, then  S P w w > . 
 
The job destruction rule can be derived by evaluating the asset equation (5) at the reserva-
tion threshold  R x = . Taking into account the wage equation (23) we obtain: 












.     (38) 
In order to close the model, we still have to determine the reservation income of a STU 
worker,  I rU , and the transition probabilities of the method of random search.  
In equilibrium the STU and the LTU, by assumption, are indifferent to the active and the 
passive search strategies so that  () U l b UI + + = ρ  and  U U U S P = = . With these conditions, 
the reservation income of a STU worker is equal to the sum of the unemployment benefit, the 
real return of leisure and the differential rent  I P U U − : 
() I P I U U l b rU − + + = .       (39) 
Taking account of the fact that job seekers in equilibrium are indifferent between the two 
search strategies, we finally obtain the transition probabilities generated by the search market, 
() I p θ  and  () S p θ , as follows.  
 
LEMMA 5 [RANDOM SEARCH]. (i) From the Bellman equation (15) and  () U l b UI + + = ρ  
it follows that, in equilibrium, the expected search costs of a STU worker who is randomly 
searching are equal to his share of the match rent,  I I I I U W p c − = . From this, together with 
the sharing rule (19) and the asset equation (31), we obtain 
()













.        (40) 
(ii) Using the assumption  U U U S P = =  and the asset equation (18), it follows that, in 
equilibrium, the expected search costs of a LTU worker who is randomly searching equal his 
expected share in the match rent:  () ( ) ( ) () ∫ − + − = − S T
H S S S S S I S t dF U t W U W H F p q c τ τ ) ( ) 1 ( . 
From this equilibrium condition we obtain with respect to the sharing rule (20) and the option 
value (A2)  










θ θ 1 1
.      (41)   17
The equilibrium of the search model consists of solutions  () [] u T T R S P S I P , , , , , , , , 1 θ θ Θ Π Π  
to the equations (A5) – (A12) in Appendix II and the equilibrium unemployment (3). The 
comparative static effects of the hiring subsidy are indeterminate as a consequence of the mul-
tiplicity of the channels through which ALMP work. Which effect dominates is an empirical 
question. We therefore have carried out a series of numerical experiments.  
7. SIMULATION 
Parameters and matching functions. The choice of the baseline parameter values, Table A1 
in Appendix II, is made with respect to the design of the experiments of Mortensen/Pissarides 
(1999, 2001) and the restraint that in equilibrium the number of active job seekers,  I S  and S, 
have to be “interior solutions” to the model. 
The bargaining power of the workers is  50 . 0 = β , the marginal product of a job at full pro-
ductivity is  100 = y . During their training period, the LTU produce a marginal product of 
60 = yz ; the value of leisure is  30 = l , UI benefits are  30 = b ; the real interest rate r is 2 %; 
the probability of a productivity shock λ is 10 %; the search costs are  40 = I c  and  25 = S c , 
and the recruiting costs of a vacancy amount to  30 = k .  
The distribution function  () x G  of the productivity shocks is assumed to be uniform on 
[] 1 , α , with the lower support  65 . 0 = α . Training costs  0 ≥ t  are exponentially distributed with 
mean  15 1 = δ . 
The matching functions of the PES and the search market are of the Cobb Douglas type 
(Petrongolo/Pissarides 2001). For a given vacancy the probabilities of a contact with a job 
seeker are 
PES:       () ()
Φ Θ Θ
− ∗ =
1 1 ef Q      (42) 
Search market:    () ()
φ θ θ
− ∗ =
1 1 d q .     (43) 
The values of the "total factor productivities" of the basic scenario are  30 . 0 = = d ef ; for 
the elasticities of the job matches M and m with respect to vacancies we use  5 4 = Φ  and 
5 1 = φ  respectively. Thus, among the arguments of the matching technology of the PES, the 
vacancies dominate, while on the search market the active job seekers are the dominating in-
put factor.  
Indicators. The time period which corresponds to the duration of a model period is, as we 
assume, the yearly quarter. The following indicators are used to evaluate the simulations: (1) 
Quarterly unemployment rate u in percent; (2) quarterly unemployment incidence  G λ  in per-
cent; (3) unemployment duration of active and passive LTU job seekers  S d  and  P d  respec-
tively in quarters; (4) ratio of the STU making job-to-job transitions,  100 ∗ = u S p p I I I I σ ; 
(5) fraction of active job seekers among the LTU,  100 ∗ = u S S σ ; (6) fraction of active job 
seekers among the inflowing STU,  100 ∗ I SI ; (7) the outside wage  I w  negotiated by the   18
STU making job-to-job transitions; (8) the indicator for the outside wages of the LTU, which 
equals the mean of the distribution of outside wages, s. Lemma 4, as a percentage of the out-
side wage of the STU,  100 ∗ = I P w w wIP .  wIP − 100  denotes the average wage penalty 
which a LTU worker placed by the PES must accept due to his low productivity and the train-
ing costs. (9) fraction of the LTU,  () 100 1 ∗ − = u u LTU S ; (10) placement rate of the PES, 
PES (see App. II for a definition); (11) UI benefits as a percentage of the net product, 
100 ∗ = np b u PLMP . The net product is  () ( ) ( )( ) ] 1 [ 1
1 R G G x dG x y u np R − ∫ − = , where the 
term  () y u − 1 , which denotes the net product for  1 = x , is weighted with the conditional ex-
pected value of the productivity parameter  R x ≥ . (12) Expenses of the PES for active labour 
market policies in percent of the net product, ALMP (s. App. II). 
The results of the simulation with the upper bound H for the hiring subsidy are shown 
graphically in the Appendices IV – VI. We distinguish between an ALMP design which sup-
ports only placements by the PES (regime  0 = τ ) and a policy which gives equal support to 
both search methods (regime  1 = τ ). Appendix IV shows the results for both regimes ( 0 = τ  
and  1 = τ ) with the baseline parameter values from Tab. A1. Appendix V describes the results 
for  0 = τ  at different values for the workers' bargaining strength ( 45 . 0 = β  and  55 . 0 = β ). 
Appendix VI depicts the results for  0 = τ  at varying values for the matching productivity of 
the PES ( 25 . 0 = ef and 35 . 0 = ef ). The App. V und VI show clearly that the results 1 – 4 are 
also stable with shocks which affect central model parameters. Moreover, App. V und VI 
show additional results which are based on the effects of the policy parameter ef and the struc-
tural parameter of the wage bargaining system β .  
Throughout the following paragraphs we compare the results of our numerical experiments 
with the corresponding data of the OECD (2001 a, b).  
Result 1. The figures, App. IV – VI, show that consistent with Mortensen/Pissarides 
(1999, 2001) the hiring subsidy H increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment u.  
For example in the regime  0 = τ , where only PES placements are subsidised u increases 
from 7,4 % ( 0 = H ) to 8,4 % ( 30 = H ). 
In comparison: in the year 2000 the rate of unemployment in the OECD was in total 6.4 % 
and in the EU 8.3 %. 
In the standard model of Mortensen/Pissarides the hiring subsidy lowers the costs of job 
creation, so that on the one hand job creation is stimulated and the duration of unemployment 
falls. On the other hand the unemployment incidence increases. Because of the increasing 
tightness the opportunity costs of a filled job rise and the match partners separate faster. The 
second effect outweighs the first so that overall employment decreases. 
In our model four factors have an affect on equilibrium unemployment, s. equation (3). 
First the incidence, second the length of the unemployment spells of active and passive long-
term unemployed, third the ratio of job-to-job transitions and forth the share of passive job 
seekers among the LTU workers.   19
The main causes for the positive correlation between ALMP and the unemployment rate in 
our model are the following. First, firms and workers only enjoy the benefits of the hiring 
subsidy if they are matched by the PES (regime  0 = τ ). The hiring subsidy therefore increases 
the opportunity costs of a start-up in the first and second stage of the search process. The con-
sequences are that the fraction of active job seekers among the LTU,  S σ , and the ratio of job-
to-job transitions,  I I p σ , fall or that the fractions of those STU and LTU who prefer to wait 
for a placement by the PES increase. Second, the hiring subsidy reduces duration of unem-
ployment but only the duration of the active job seekers,  S d , while the average spell length 
P d  of an unemployed worker who decides on the passive search strategy increases. The rea-
son for this is that the growing number of passive job seekers is concentrated in the third stage 
of the matching process. As a result the tightness between the registers of the PES decreases, 
the reaction time ) ( / 1 1 Θ P +  rises and the probability of a successful match falls. It is not 
surprising that the duration of the unemployment spell of the active job seeker falls because, 
on the one hand, the supply of vacancies rises due to the hiring subsidy and, on the other 
hand, the number of active job seekers falls.  
ALMP thus increases not only the job destruction rate but also the duration of the unem-
ployment spell of passive job seekers as well as their fraction of all unemployed. 
The development of the fraction of the LTU who are randomly searching depends on the 
design of the ALMP. In the regime  0 = τ , where only PES placements are subsidised, the 
fraction of active job seekers among the LTU decreases. As a result the fraction of passive job 
seekers rises in  0 = τ  not only among the STU but also among the LTU.  
Result 2. Although the hiring subsidy raises the fraction of active job seekers among 
the LTU, the symmetrical labour market policy ( 1 = τ ) lowers overall employment. The 
reasons are: First the symmetrical labour market policy increases the duration of job 
search of the active job seekers. Second it leads to a crowding-out of active job seekers 
among the STU and reduces the job-to-job transitions even below the level reached in 
the regime  0 = τ . Third, as in the regime  0 = τ   P d  increases. Nevertheless, due to the 
growing number of active job seekers among the LTU, the equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment does not increase as much as it does in the regime  0 = τ . 
Result 3. Active labour market policy has the following additional consequences (in 
0 = τ ): (1) The fraction of job seekers threatened with long-term unemployment or be-
ing long-term unemployed (LTU) – in the model those are LTU workers who are unem-
ployed for longer than 3 months (1 quarter) – increases from 72.0 % ( 0 = H ) to 73.6 % 
( 30 = H ). (2) The costs for PLMP increase from 2.7 % ( 0 = H ) to 3.1 % ( 30 = H ) of 
the net product, while the costs for ALMP ( 30 = H ) reach the value of 0.3 % of the net 
product. 
In comparison: in the year 2000 the incidence of job seekers threatened with long-term un-
employment or being long-term unemployed (3 months and over) was 65.3 % of total unem-
ployment in the OECD and 75.6 % in the EU. Moreover, in 1999 the average OECD member   20
incurred costs for UI benefits of 1.0 % of the GDP as well as costs for “subsidies to regular 
employment in the private sector” of 0.1 % of the GDP. 
Result 4. Without ALMP ( 0 = H ) the LTU placed by the PES must accept on average 
a 5.6 % wage penalty compared to a STU worker when making a job-to-job transition. 
ALMP ( 30 = H ) turn this penalty into an advantage of 3.5 % for the LTU under the re-
gime  0 = τ .  
In comparison: based on the first seven rounds of the British Household Panel Survey, Aru-
lampalam (2001) estimates that, after an unemployment spell, a worker must accept a wage 
penalty of 5.7 % compared to making a job-to-job transition
7. 
The App. V und VI show clearly that the results 1 – 4 are also stable with shocks, which af-
fect central model parameters. In addition the graphs depict two further interesting effects.  
Result 5. The more effective the matching service of the PES – measured by the total 
factor productivity ef of the PES matching function under the regime  0 = τ  and without 
ALMP ( 0 = H ) – the higher equilibrium unemployment is.  
The reasons are: first the more effective job placement service of the PES raises the oppor-
tunity costs of the filled jobs and therefore the incidence. While a job with  30 . 0 = ef  has a 
mean durability of  36 100 * ) ( 1 = R G λ  quarters or 9.0 years, the durability falls to 8.2 years 
for 35 . 0 = ef . Second, the fraction of active job seekers among the STU and thus the ratio of 
the STU making job-to-job transitions decreases with increasing ef. Third, even though the 
higher productivity of the PES lowers the unemployment duration of both search strategies – 
for the passive strategy the duration falls from 5 to 4.8 quarters, for the active from 1.8 to 1.6 
quarters – the first two negative effects outweigh the positive third effect. 
Why does the duration of the unemployment spells decrease? The fact that  P d  falls is ob-
viously due to the higher productivity of the PES. The decrease of  S d  results from the reduc-
tion in the number of the active job seekers among the LTU. This improves the chances of the 
remaining searchers who stick to their search strategy.  
Of course the fraction of PES matches, and thus the success which the PES will claim, 
grows with the effectiveness of its placement service. 
Result 6. The increase in the bargaining power of the workers as shown in App. V 
from  50 . 0 = β  to  55 . 0 = β  lowers the durability of a job from 9.0 to 8.7 years and in-
creases the duration of the unemployment spells – the duration rises by about 18 days: 
P d  increases from 5.0 to 5.2 quarters and  S d  from 1.8 to 1.9 quarters. 
Although the durability of a job falls and the length of an unemployment spell rises 
overall employment increases.  
Why? First, the higher bargaining power of the workers increases the share of the match 
rent appropriated by the applicants who are actively searching and decreases the profit share 
of the firms. Second, firms react to the smaller profit share with a lower supply of vacancies, 
                                                 
7   This wage penalty increases to 14 % in the fourth year after the unemployment spell and then decreases again 
(Arulampalam 2001).   21
the transition rates of the unemployed decrease and, therefore, durations increase. Third, be-
cause of the increasing gains from active job search the fraction of active job seekers among 
the STU and the LTU as well as the proportion of job-to-job transitions grow. Because the 
duration of the unemployment spell of the active job seekers is less than the unemployment 
duration of the passive unemployed,  3 . 3 = − S P d d  quarters ( 0 = H  and  55 . 0 = β ), equilib-
rium unemployment decreases, even though the incidence and the duration increase. 
8. SUMMARY 
This paper presents a search model in discrete time. Job seekers can choose between two 
methods of search, matching by the PES, where firms register their vacancies, and random 
search on the search market, where firms advertise vacancies. The matching process includes 
three stages. In the first only the active job seekers among the STU search randomly for a va-
cancy. The STU have lost their job at the end of the previous period and, therefore, of all the 
unemployed possess the best information about current labour market conditions. Their appli-
cations are more targeted and reach the firms earlier than the applications of all the other un-
employed. In the second stage the active job seekers among the LTU apply for jobs, and fi-
nally, in the third stage, also those LTU who are sent by the PES. Firms prefer applications 
from the STU, not only because they arrive first, but also because unlike the LTU they imme-
diately work with full productivity and do not generate training costs. The PES subsidises the 
training costs with a hiring subsidy. Two regimes are compared. Under one regime only the 
matches created by the PES are subsidised, under the other the subsidy is paid for each match 
with a LTU worker, irrespective of the method of search. Under both regimes the unemploy-
ment rate increases with an increasing hiring subsidy. The reasons are the increasing job de-
struction rate, the decreasing fraction of active job seekers among the STU and of job-to-job 
transitions, and the increasing duration of unemployment of the passive job seekers. 
In contrast to the standard search model, the ratio of active job seekers is endogenous in our 
model. Therefore, an increase in the bargaining strength of the job seekers has three conse-
quences. First, as in the standard model, the share of the match rent appropriated by the work-
ers increases, while the profit share decreases. As a consequence the job destruction rate in-
creases and the supply of vacancies is reduced. Second, a lower supply of vacancies reduces 
the transition rates into employment and durations grow. Third, the fact that unemployment 
does not increase but decreases is a consequence of the growing rate of active job seekers and 
of the fact that active in comparison with passive job seekers have a much shorter unemploy-
ment duration. The reason that the unemployed switch to the active search strategy and that 
the rate of passive job seekers falls is, naturally, the higher share of the match rent and the 
higher wages. 
Of course, the PES can increase its placement success by improving the effectiveness of its 
matching service. Nevertheless, the job destruction rate will increase and the fraction of active 
job seekers among the STU will decrease so that the improved effectiveness of the PES will   22
lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment, although the unemployment duration for 
both groups of jobseekers, the passive and the active, is reduced.  
The economic policy consequences of the model are clear: the effects of ALMP and profil-
ing techniques to increase the effectiveness of the state placement service depend on the target 
group. For unemployed with low private search costs compared to their productivity, not only 
the policy instruments of ALMP but also the actual job placement activities of the PES are 
counterproductive. On the other hand the instruments of ALMP and the placement service of 
the PES have a stimulating effect in job creation for target groups with such high private 
search costs that in equilibrium without policy it is not worthwhile for these groups to actively 
search for a job. But policy makers have to take into account that despite their stimulating 
effects these instruments of ALMP reduce aggregate employment. 
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APPENDIX I 
Option values  P V  and  S V . 1. When firms decide whether to post a vacancy they know the 
c.d.f. of the training costs  () t F , the reservation costs  i T  and the conditions for PES subsidies 
{} 0 , 1 ∈ τ . Before the training costs are revealed the asset value of a vacancy expecting a con-
tact with a LTU worker placed by the PES is 




P P t dF t H t t dF V Π Π
0 .      (A1) 
If the training costs of the LTU are fully subsidised, the job has the value  P Π . The second 
term in (A1) denotes the expected value of the job if the training costs are higher than the sub-
sidy bound H but below the reservation costs  P T . Finally, if the training costs exceed  P T , the   23
match partners separate immediately. Analogously, before training costs are known the condi-
tional option value of a vacancy that meets an active job seeker among the LTU is 







S S ∫ ∫ ∫
∞
+ − + + =
τ
τ
τ Π Π ) (
0 ,     (A2) 
where  1 = τ  if the PES also subsidises the matches formed by random search, otherwise 
0 = τ . If the match specific training costs of the job seeker exceed  S T , the agents separate 
and, in view of the third stage of the matching process, the vacancy takes on the value of the 
outside option  P QV .  
 
2. With respect to the asset equations (32) – (35) and Lemma 3 the option values (A1) and 
(A2) of a vacancy transform to 
() ( ) ( ) ( )() ( ) ] [ 1 , ∫ − + − − =
P T
H P P P P t dF t T H T H F H T V β
                     and              (A3) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H T V Q t dF t T H T H F H T T V P P
T
H S S S P S





 − + − − = ∫      (A4) 
APPENDIX II 
The model equations in implicit form are:  
() () ( ) ( ) 0
1






y H T T R J S P S I P λ
β Π θ θ Θ Π Π    (A5) 
() () ( ) ( ) () ()
() () ( ) () 0 ,
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 2 =
− − −
− −
− − − − − ≡ ⋅ H T V
T F q q P
q q P





Π β ρ Π  (A6) 
() ( ) ( ) 0 1 3 = − − − ≡ ⋅ H T J P P β Π           ( A 7 )  
() ()
() () ( ) ( ) [] 0 , , , , , 1 1
, , , , , 4 = − − −
−
≡ ⋅ τ θ Θ β Π
θ
τ θ Θ
H T T V
q
H T T V k
J S S P I
I I
S S P I  (A8) 
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() () ( ) 0
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   (A9) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 6 = − − − − ≡ ⋅ H T V Q H T T J P P S P Θ τ                  (A10) 
() () () ( ) ( ) [] 0 , , , , , 1 1
1
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.         (A12)   24
Tab. A1: The baseline parameter of the model 
β  r  λ  y z l b k  I c   S c   δ 1  α  ef d Φ φ 
0.50  0.02  0.10  100 0.60 30 30 30 40 25 15  0.65  0.30  0.30  5 / 4 5 / 1  
 
The indicators PES and ALMP are defined as follows: 
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APPENDIX III 
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Write the sharing rule used for the negotiations with an insider (22) as 
(P1)      ( ) () () x x W UI Π β β β − − = − ) 1 ( 1 . 
Substitute  () x Π  and  () x W  with the asset pricing equations (5) and (6) out of (P1) and the 
inside-wage (23) follows. 
(ii) From the sharing rule used for the negotiations with the STU (19) follows 
(P2)      () I I I I W V U Π β β β β − − = − − ) 1 ( 1 . 
Now the outside-wage (24) for STU workers follows from (P2), the asset pricing equations 
(7) and (8) and (P1). 
(iii) Write the sharing rule (21) as 
(P3)      ( ) ( ) ( ) () () t t W H t U P P P Π β β β β − − = − − − 1 1 . 
Substitute the values of the filled job and the employed worker with (9) and (10) out of 
(P3), and take account of (P1) and (23) to get the wage equation  
(P4)   () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ) ( 1 1 1 − − − − − − + − − = ρ β ρ β β H t U U y z w t w I P P . 
The wage equations (25) and (26) follow from (P4). Notice that the last term on the RHS of 
(P4) is equal to zero for  H t ≤ . 
(iv) Like in (iii) the wage equations (27) and (28) follow from the asset pricing equations 
(9) and (10), (P1) and the sharing rule (20), which we can write as   25
(P5)     () ( ) () ( ) t t W QV H t U S S P S Π β β β ι β β − − = − − − − ) ( 1 1 . 
Proof of equation (29). Rearrange the asset pricing equation (17), and take account of the 
equilibrium condition  () U b UI + = ρ  to get 
(P6)  
() ( ) []
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )  

 
 − + − − −
= − − − −
∫
P T
H P P P P S I
P S I I P
t dF U t W U W H F q q P
T F q q P U U
1 1
) ( ) 1 ( 1 1
 
Substitute the sharing rule (21) into the worker’s share of the match rent on the RHS of 
(P6) and take account of the asset equation of the outside option (A1), to find the equation of 
the differential rent (29). 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Equations (4) and (5) imply  () () () ∫ + − =
1 0 R h dG h R w yR Π λ  and 
( ) () () () () ∫ + − = +
1
R h dG h x w yx x r Π λ Π λ . From these two equations together with the wage 
equation (23) the statement follows. 
(ii) Insert the wage equation (24) into the asset equation (7) and take account of equation 
(5) to derive the asset pricing equation (31). 
(iii) The asset pricing equations (32) and (33) follow from substituting the wage equation 
(P4) into (9) and rearranging terms with respect to the asset equation (5).  
(iv) Similar to the above argument we can derive the asset pricing equations (34) and (35) 
from (9) by taking into account the wage equations (27) and (28). 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Write the asset equation (33) as  () = − + P P P T H T Π  
() ( ) H TP P − − − β Π 1 , and take account of the condition of the reservations costs, 
() 0 = − + P P P T H T Π .  
Write (34) and (35) as  () ( ) ( ) H T QV T H T S P P S S S ι β β Π Π − − − + = − + 1 , take account of 
() P S S S QV T H T = − + Π  to derive  () P P S QV H T − + − = τ β Π 1 . Substitute (36) into the last 
equation and the statement follows. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Substitute  1 − − = ρ β P P S QV w w  into the wage equation (28) to get 
() ( )1 − + − − = ρ τ β P S P S S QV H T w T w . By Lemma 3  H T QV H T P P S − = + − τ . Therefore we 
can conclude taking into account the wage equation (26): 
() ( ) () P P P P S S T w H T w T w = − − = − 1 ρ β . 
(ii) First we define the auxiliary functions  ) (x z  und  ) , ( τ x K ,  [ ) H T x P − ∈ , 0 , as 
(P7)       () x H T x z P − − =  




() () H x z F
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) , ( τ x K  is continuously differentiable on [ ) H TP − , 0 , if the p.d.f. of the training costs  ) (t f , 
0 > t , is differentiable. 
Inserting the wage equations (26) and (28) into the expectations of the wage distributions, 
P w  and  S w , and taking account of  1 − − = ρ β P P S QV w w  and (37), we can write  P w  and  S w  
with respect to (P8) as 
(P9)       ()1 1 , 0 − − = ρ β K w w P P  
(P10)      () 1 , − − = ρ τ β P P S QV K w w . 
Now, (P9) and (P10) imply:  () ( ) τ , 1 , 0 P S P QV K K w w < ⇔ > , where  {} 1 , 0 ∈ τ . 
Assume that  
(P11)      () () τ τ , 0 , K x K > ,      and 
(P12)      () () 1 , 0 0 , 0 K K ≥ , 
Assume  1 = τ , then the statement follows from (P11). For  0 = τ  the inequalities (P11), 
(P12) and  0 > P QV  imply that  () ( ) ( ) 1 , 0 0 , 0 0 , K K QV K P ≥ > . Using the inequalities again the 
statement follows. 
 
If the training costs are exponentially distributed,  [ ) H T x P − ∈ , 0 , and  0 ≥ H , then the 
inequalities (P11) and (P12) hold. 
1. Let  t e t f δ δ − = ) (,   0 > δ , then  
(P13)   () () () []
() () () ()
H x z e
x z H
e

















2. From (P13) and  0 ≥ H  we can conclude that (P12) holds.  
3. The function  () τ , x K  is continuously differentiable on [ ) H TP − , 0 . To prove that  () τ , x K  
is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to x, we compute the partial derivative of 
() τ , x K : 








z H H z
e




δ δτ τ δ δ τ
+ −







For  0 > z  it is true that  () () () [ ] H H z e z e x x K δτ τ δ δ τ − + − − + > ⇔ > ∂ ∂ 2 1 0 , . As the ine-
quality on the RHS of the equivalence holds for  0 ≥ H τ  the statement follows.  
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APPENDIX V BARGAINING STRENGTH (τ  = 0) 
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